

## 1 ☐ Value determination

### ✓ Single attribute value

- Utility (a la expected utility theory & prospect theory)
  - Only affected by reference point and framing
- It's all relative - Alternatives matter
- Mere exposure effect

### ✓ Multi-attribute value

- Normative methods
  - Componential context model
- Heuristics

### ✓ A “new” approach - purely heuristic (Gigerenzer & Brunswik)

## 2 ☐ It's all relative

### ✓ Items are valued in a particular context

- Items are compared to already-experienced items to determine their value (see later discussion of complex value).
  - The general form of Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory.
- Items are compared to visible alternatives
  - Earlier discussion of decoy effect.

## 3 ☐ Mere exposure effect

### ✓ Familiar items are judged to be more liked than novel items (Zajonc, 1968).

- Familiarity does *not* necessarily breed contempt.
- *Mere* exposure increases value.
  - This is the principle behind advertising.
- This effect occurs even when the exposure is unconscious (and is stronger...)

## 4 ☐ Affective judgment without recognition

### ✓ Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc (1980)

- Presented octagons during initial phase (mere exposure phase) at durations of 1 ms.
- Judgment phase - shown pairs of octagons.
  - Which one do you like better?
  - Which one did you see earlier?
- Had definite preference for unrecognized but repeated octagons (~ 65% vs. 35%).

## 5 ☐ Mere exposure?

### The role of complexity

#### ✓ Cox and Cox (2002)

- Used two types of stimuli, visually complex and visually simple (fashionable dresses).
  - Initially, simple designs liked more (4.2 vs. 3.2, 7-pt scale).
- With exposure, complex designs increase (4.3).
- With exposure, simple designs decrease (3.6)

#### ✓ Berlyne's (1970) hypothesis

- Complex stimuli are initially too complex, but exposure increases familiarity.
- But, repetition of simple stimuli creates boredom.
- Hypothesized an *optimum stimulation level*.

## 6 ☐ When *does* familiarity breed contempt?

### ✓ Norton, Frost, and Ariely (2007) report circumstances involving the *judgment of people* (on-line

dating simulation and real data).

- With exposure, dates were judged less liked. Why?

✓ Exposure involved *acquiring new information* about the person.

✓ Liking was based on perceived similarity between self and other - new information made judge aware of *differences*.

- So, ambiguity was a good thing. Be mysterious!

## 7 ☐ Multi-attribute value

✓ Many choice situations involve multiple attributes

- *Computer*: quality, cost, RAM, disk size, video-RAM, quality of support, warranty, etc.
- *Mate*: cleanliness, personality, facial attractiveness, body, earning potential, family.

✓ How is all of this information weighted and integrated?

- Theories like prospect theory are silent about multi-attribute situations.

## 8 ☐ Two classes of methods

✓ Normative

✓ Heuristics

## 9 ☐ Normative methods

✓ These methods are *exhaustive* and consider all of the alternatives and attributes.

✓ Multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT)

- Weight all attributes by their importance.
- Consider each alternative one at a time and calculate a “global utility”
  - $GU = \text{attribute 1} * \text{weight 1} + \text{attribute 2} * \text{weight 2} + \dots$
- Choose the option with the highest global utility.

## 10 ☐ Normative methods, cont.

✓ Additive difference method

- Compare two alternatives at a time.
- Compare attribute-by-attribute - estimate the difference between the alternatives.
- Sum up all of the differences to create an overall difference score.
- Keep the winner of this comparison and compare with another alternative.
- Continue until only one winner left.

## 11 ☐ Componential context model (Tversky & Simonson, 1993)

✓ Recall the effect of less preferred alternatives on decision making?

✓ This model allows for the components or attributes to change in importance as a function of context.

✓ Consequence

- Losses in the value of one attribute can loom larger than gains in the value of another
- For example - losing one feature can have bigger impact than gaining new feature.

## 12 ☐ Heuristics

✓ Elimination by aspects (Tversky, 1972)

- Pick the most important attribute and set a cutoff “acceptability” level for that attribute.
- Throw out all alternatives that don’t meet level.
- Pick second most important attribute and do same thing for remaining options.
- Continue until one left.
- *Not guaranteed to find best overall alternative, it’s somewhat time consuming, but it does get used by some people.*

- 13 ☐ **Heuristics, cont.**
- ✓ Recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer)
    - Easy to do
      - Earlier examples
      - Brand name shopping
    - *Not guaranteed to find best overall alternative, but does surprisingly well in many cases.*
    - Mere exposure effect...
- 14 ☐ **Heuristics, cont.**
- ✓ Disjunctive heuristic
    - Set “acceptability” cutoff points for the important attributes
    - Look for first alternative that is at least as good as the cutoff value on ANY attribute.
    - *Tends to select a heterogeneous subset of “specialists.”*
  - ✓ There are many other heuristics that are used by people.
- 15 ☐ **Evaluation of complex decision making**
- ✓ MAUT (and additive difference) produces best decisions
    - But, Payne, Bettman, & Johnson (1993) found that many heuristics performed nearly as well.
  - ✓ McAllister, Mitchell, & Beach (1979) found that when the chooser was more “accountable” they tended toward the more normative methods.
- 16 ☐ **Evaluation, cont.**
- ✓ The use of heuristics is susceptible to order and context effects.
  - ✓ Some alternatives don’t have readily “separable” attributes
    - For example, color choice for painting a room.
      - Hue, brightness, and saturation.
    - Non-separable attributes (“integral” attributes) can’t be differentially weighted or considered.
      - Requires a holistic judgment.
- 17 ☐ **Gigerenzer’s satisficing**
- ✓ Proposal
    - The mind is not computing intricate probabilities and utilities
    - The mind is able to reach into an “adaptive toolbox” filled with *fast and frugal heuristics*.
    - Value is *heuristically* driven.
- 18 ☐ **Perspectives on rationality**
- ✓ Unbounded rationality
    - E.g., optimization under constraints
  - ✓ Bounded rationality
- 19 ☐ **Unbounded rationality**
- ✓ No regard for constraints of time, knowledge, or computational capacity on human decision making.
  - ✓ Traditionally modeled by probability theory

- Encompasses expected utility theory
  - ✓ At best, it's a normative model; at worst, it's a poor descriptor of how people make decisions.
- 20 ☐ Optimization under constraints
- ✓ Considers constraints
  - ✓ Adopts a “stopping rule” to constrain the search process.
    - This optimizes the search for the right decision or best solution given the constraints
  - ✓ Problem
    - The optimization process also requires considerable resources!
- 21 ☐ Example: Approximating expected value of a lottery ticket
- ✓ 1. Determine how much time you have.
  - ✓ 2. Identify the amount of knowledge you have about probability theory and mathematics.
  - ✓ 3. Identify how much you can keep in memory at once.
  - ✓ 4. Determine the number of values you can compute in the time available and the amount of rounding necessary (memory limits).
  - ✓ 5. NOW compute given the above limitations.
- 22 ☐ Example 2
- 23 ☐ Bounded rationality
- ✓ Two components
    - The limitations of the human mind
    - The structure of the environment
  - ✓ Consequences
    - Humans must use approximate methods to handle most tasks because of our limitations.
    - But, the best methods are determined by the structure of the environment
- 24 ☐ Gigerenzer's observations
- ✓ People tend to use dumb heuristics that are not optimal or even ‘coherent’ but *work*.
    - These heuristics tap into cues that have some validity in the real environment.
    - But, their use may seem stupid from a more analytical perspective.
- 25 ☐ Example 1: Identifying the relative populations of cities
- 26 ☐ Method 1 - a poor heuristic
- ✓ Those starting with a letter near the beginning of the alphabet are bigger.
  - ✓ Easy to compute, but not valid.
- 27 ☐ Method 2 - a good heuristic:  
The *recognition heuristic*
- ✓ Cities which you have heard a lot about are bigger than those you haven't heard much about.
  - ✓ Easy to compute, surprising validity.
- 28 ☐ Data

✓ Gigerenzer & Goldstein (1996) quizzed Americans about pairs of 25 major German cities and 25 American cities

✓ Which is bigger?

– Americans cities

• Correct: 70% of the time

– German cities

• Correct: 73% of the time!

✓ Why?

## 29 ☐ Example 2:

### Predicting the stock market

✓ Borges et al. (1999)

✓ Examined stock recognition and performance

– Germans and Americans

– Laypeople and experts

## 30 ☐ Notion: A beneficial level of ignorance

✓ Experts can't use the recognition heuristic because they recognize nearly everything.

✓ Recognition heuristic less useful for domestic stocks (own country) than international stocks.

## 31 ☐ Predictions

✓ Laypeople will do better than experts with the recognition heuristic

✓ People will do better with international stocks than with domestic stocks with the recognition heuristic

– Note: I'll only talk about the Americans in the study.

## 32 ☐ Results: American stocks

✓ Americans using the recognition heuristic **underperformed** the stock market index for American stocks.

– 8% less than index (index returned 24% during the period).

## 33 ☐ Results: German stocks

✓ Americans using the recognition heuristic **overperformed** the stock market index for German companies.

– 33% more than index (index was 32% during the period).

## 34 ☐ Results: Laypeople outperformed the experts

✓ Laypeople, who only pick stocks that are highly recognizable, netted 5-10% higher returns than the experts did.

## 35 ☐ So, with enough ignorance one can outperform stock indices

✓ Note: some indices only include the major, recognizable companies.

✓ Too much ignorance (dart-board choice) does poorly.

## 36 ☐ How can so little information do so well?

✓ Consideration of irrelevant or nearly irrelevant information undermines decision

making process.

- ✓ You start to pay attention to the small stuff and sacrifice attention to the big, important issues.

### 37 ☐ Leon Brunswik's perspective

- ✓ Two issues
  - Validity of the chosen attributes (the structure of the world)
  - Use of these attributes by the decision maker (human limitations or error)
  - Goal: use attributes based on their validity
- ✓ Performance is limited by validity of cues
  - Perfect (or even good) performance may not be obtainable!

### 38 ☐ Brunswik's Lens Model

- ✓ Conceptualizes the process as 'seeing the world through a lens'
  - Is your lens in focus so that you are getting a realistic picture of the world?
  - Rose-colored glasses?
- ✓ Brunswik wanted to analyze properties of the world, not just the organism:
  - "psychology has forgotten that it is a science of organism-environment relationships and has become a science of the organism" (Brunswik, 1957, p. 6)

### 39 ☐ Lens Model

### 40 ☐ Lack of selectivity: The *dilution effect*

### 41 ☐ Dilution effect, cont.

- ✓ Linking diagnostic with nondiagnostic information produces regressive judgments.
  - Example: people drew strong inferences about the likely GPA of a student given studying habits, but moderated their predictions on receiving irrelevant information (e.g., the number of plants the student kept). (Nisbett, Zukier, and Lemley, 1981).
- ✓ Documented in medical practice (Rakow et al., 2005) and auditing (Hackenbrack, 1992) *inter alia*.
- ✓ Dilution effect is often *worse* when people are held accountable (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).

### 42 ☐ Evaluation of heuristic perspective

- ✓ Fast and frugal heuristics do a remarkably good job describing people's behavior under many circumstances.
  - People quite likely do use some of these simple heuristics in their judgment of value and subsequent decision making.
- ✓ Approach is clearly not normative.
- ✓ Approach has too many degrees of freedom
  - Too many tools in the toolbox?
- ✓ No general formalization.