

- 1 ☐ Prospect theory
 - ✓ Developed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979)
 - ✓ Defines a relative “value function”
 - Gains and losses, not absolute value
 - Gains and losses have different value functions
- 2 ☐ Value function
- 3 ☐ Prospect theory and the framing effect
 - ✓ Because the value function for losses is steeper, losses “loom larger” than gains
 - ✓ Framing the problem as a loss changes the value function
- 4 ☐ Relative to a reference point
 - ✓ Gains and losses are relative to a *reference point*
 - Decision making changes as the reference point is changed.
 - This reference point is variously called:
 - Reference point
 - Status quo
 - Aspiration level
- 5 ☐ Justification
 - ✓ Our perceptual apparatus is attuned to *change* or *difference*, not absolute value.
 - ✓ This is the major difference between prospect theory and expected utility theories.
- 6 ☐ Loss aversion
 - ✓ Because losses loom large, people behave as if:
 - “Losing it matters more than gaining it would have mattered if they didn’t have it.”
 - ✓ Thus, sellers value their commodities more highly than buyers do.
 - ✓ So, give someone something free (e.g., a 3 month subscription) and they will value it more highly - they don’t want to lose it.
- 7 ☐ Theory also changes the way that probabilities are handled
 - ✓ In expected utility theories, an objective 50% is psychologically equivalent to a 50% judgment.
 - ✓ Objective probabilities are translated into psychological “decision weights”
- 8 ☐ Decision weights
 - ✓ In prospect theory, decision weight is not a linear function of the real probability
 - ✓ People overweight small probabilities and underweight moderate and large probabilities
 - ✓ One possible equation:
- 9 ☐ Decision weight function
- 10 ☐ Small probabilities

- ✓ At the low end of the spectrum, the curve is steep.
 - ✓ People are very sensitive to the difference between “impossible” and “possible”
- 11 ☐ Moderate probabilities
- ✓ In the middle, the curve is too flat.
 - ✓ People are under-influenced by changes in moderate probabilities.
- 12 ☐ Decision weight function
- 13 ☐ High probabilities
- ✓ Curve is again too steep.
 - ✓ People are very sensitive to the difference between “certain” and “not certain”
- 14 ☐ Data
- ✓ The overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of moderate ones is easily observed.
 - ✓ Classic example: Frequency judgment of various diseases.
- 15 ☐ Empirical weights
- 16 ☐ Affect rich vs. Affect poor - Altering gamma (γ)
- 17 ☐ Decision weight translation explains the Allais paradox
- ✓ People prefer to eliminate a small probability (which was overweighted) than to slightly reduce a moderate probability (which was underweighted)
- 18 ☐ Decision weights explain the “certainty effect”
- ✓ Reminder, people prefer an option that reduces the probability from .01 to .00 than from .02 to .01.
 - ✓ People prefer a 100% chance of getting \$100 over a 95% chance of getting \$120.
 - Even though expected value of second option is higher (.95*\$120 = \$114).
- 19 ☐ They also explain the pseudocertainty effect
- ✓ You can manipulate choice through the psychological representation of the certainty effect
- 20 ☐ Example of pseudocertainty effect
- ✓ An insurance policy that protects against fire and flood can be presented as one that provides 100% protection against fire and none against flood or a 50% protection against both
 - The first policy is generally preferred.
- 21 ☐ Another example: Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein (1982)
- ✓ Two forms of vaccination questionnaires about a disease that afflicts 20% of people
 - Probabilistic protection
 - Would you receive a vaccination that protects half of the people receiving it?
 - » 40% said “yes”
 - “Certain” protection

- Would you receive a vaccination that gives complete protection against one strain (afflicting 10% of people) but none against the other (afflicting 10% of people)?
 - » 57% said “yes”

22 ☐ Related marketing example

- ✓ “Buy one get one free”
- ✓ The free one seems more attractive than half-off of both.
- ✓ (related because this doesn’t involve “certainty”)

23 ☐ Aversion to stock market volatility

- ✓ In the long run, stocks significantly outperform bonds and other conservative investments
- ✓ So, why do people prefer conservative investments for long-term retirement accounts?

24 ☐ Rationales for conservative investing

- ✓ 1. Risk-averse in the face of gain.
- ✓ 2. The ups-and-downs of stocks
 - The gains feel good
 - But, the losses loom larger.

25 ☐ Evaluation

- ✓ Prospect theory is much better than expected utility theory.
- ✓ It is the best comprehensive description of the decision making process.
- ✓ But...

26 ☐ It is not complete

- ✓ There are phenomena that it does not predict or explain
 - E.g., see Preference Reversals in Chapter 8.
- ✓ It assumes some level of sophistication by the decision maker
- ✓ It is not a theory of judgment (e.g., of likelihood, causation, randomness).
- ✓ It is underspecified for complex decision making.