

1 ☐ Judgment of conditional likelihood (or probability)

- ✓ Under many day-to-day circumstances you must estimate the probability of an event given that certain actions are taken.

2 ☐ Circumstances

- ✓ What are the chances of something serious if you don't go to the doctor for that cough?
- ✓ What are the chances of lead poisoning if you remove the paint vs. painting over it?
- ✓ What are the chances of getting into a clinical program if I get a C in this class?
- ✓ How likely am I to get AIDS if I have unprotected sex with this person?

3 ☐ Definition:

Conditional Probability

- ✓ The probability of an event given that another one has occurred.
- ✓  $P(A|B)$  – probability of A given B.
- ✓ Venn Diagram

4 ☐

5 ☐ Dealing with negation

- ✓  $P(A|\text{not } B)$  – probability of A given that B has not occurred.

6 ☐

7 ☐ Confusion of the inverse

- ✓ People often think that  $P(A|B) = P(B|A)$

8 ☐ Examples:

$$P(A=\text{brown}|B=\text{clear}) = .20$$

9 ☐ Example

- ✓ You learn that the probability of someone who commits a heinous crime having a history of violent behavior is 70%.
- ✓ You are then told that someone has a history of violent behavior.
- ✓ What is the probability that they will commit a violent crime?
  - $P(\text{violent past} | \text{crime}) = .70$
  - $P(\text{crime} | \text{violent past}) = ???$

10 ☐ Venn Diagrams

$$P(A=\text{violent past}|B=\text{crime}) = .70$$

11 ☐ The Ratio Rule

- ✓ This is called the “ratio rule”
  - The ratio of  $P(A|B)$  to  $P(B|A)$  is equal to the ratio of the base rates of A and B, respectively.
- ✓ Thus,  $P(A|B) = P(B|A)$  iff  $P(A) = P(B)$

- 12 ☐ Apply the ratio rule to the earlier examples....
- 13 ☐ The ratio rule and drug testing
- ✓ If  $P(\text{positive} \mid \text{drug user}) = .99$ ,  
Then what is  $P(\text{drug user} \mid \text{positive})$ ?
  - ✓ Depends on  $P(\text{positive})$  and  $P(\text{drug user})$ ...
  - ✓ If  $P(\text{positive}) = P(\text{drug user})$   
Then  $P(\text{positive} \mid \text{drug user}) =$   
 $P(\text{drug user} \mid \text{positive})$
  - ✓ But, if  $P(\text{positive})$  is higher than  $P(\text{drug user})$   
Then  $P(\text{pos} \mid \text{drug user}) > P(\text{drug user} \mid \text{pos})$   
– How much higher? Depends on  $P(\text{pos})/P(\text{drug user})$
- 14 ☐ Relative base rates are important!!!
- ✓ The base rate of each event is critical to identifying  $P(A|B)$  if you already know  $P(B|A)$ .
- 15 ☐ Example (Eddy, 1982)
- ✓ You are told that the base rate of breast cancer is 1%.
  - ✓ A physician runs a mammogram on a patient. This mammogram is known to be positive 85% of the time when the patient has cancer.
  - ✓ The test comes up positive for the patient.
- 16 ☐ What is the probability of the patient having cancer?
- ✓ Average answer: about 75%
  - ✓ Real answer: about 7 to 8%  
– We'll see why later....
  - ✓ When asked why they chose the higher value, physicians typically report that they thought that:
    - $P(\text{positive} \mid \text{cancer}) = P(\text{cancer} \mid \text{positive})$
    - But, this is only the case when:  
 $P(\text{positive}) = P(\text{cancer})$
- 17 ☐ Obvious example
- ✓ The probability of your being a woman given that you're pregnant is 1.0.  
–  $P(\text{woman} \mid \text{pregnant}) = 1.0$
  - ✓ Does that mean that the probability of being pregnant given that you're a woman is 1.0????  
–  $P(\text{pregnant} \mid \text{woman}) \lll 1.0$ .  
– Remember the ratio rule:
    - If  $P(\text{woman}) \ggg P(\text{pregnant})$   
then  $P(\text{woman} \mid \text{pregnant}) \ggg P(\text{pregnant} \mid \text{woman})$ .
- 18 ☐ Bayesian inference
- ✓ The normative (i.e. optimal) way of deciding a conditional probability is through *Bayesian inference*.

19 ☐ Bayes theorem

✓  $P(H|E) = [P(E|H) \cdot P(H)] / P(E)$

– Where:

•  $P(E) = P(E|H) \cdot P(H) + P(E|\neg H) \cdot P(\neg H)$

✓  $P(H|E)$  is the posterior probability

✓  $P(H)$  is the prior probability or base rate

20 ☐ Example

✓ A taxicab was involved in a hit and run accident one night.

✓ Two cab companies, Blue and Green, operate in the city.

21 ☐ Example, cont.

✓ 85% of the cabs in the city are Green, 15% Blue, and a witness identified cab as Blue.

✓ Court tested the witness' ability to identify cab colors under appropriate visibility conditions

– He/she made the correct identification 80% of the time (and were wrong 20% of the time).

✓ What was the probability that the cab involved was Blue rather than Green?

22 ☐ Result

✓ Participants said 80% likely it was Blue.

– Recall confusion of the inverse?

•  $P(\text{Blue}|\text{said was blue}) = P(\text{said was blue}|\text{Blue})$

✓ Bayes says 41% is the right answer.

✓ What?

23 ☐ Frequency format

24 ☐ Medical example:

✓ AIDS is found in .6% of the American population.

✓ Assume that doctors have developed a test for AIDS that is 99% effective.

– That is 99% of the time when patient is positive the test is positive and 99% of the time when patient is negative the test is negative.

✓ A particular person is giving blood and tests positive: what's the probability of AIDS?

25 ☐ What is the probability that she has AIDS?

✓ Bayes theorem: 37.4%!

26 ☐ Change the base rate....

✓ Assume person is a homosexual

– AIDS is found in 4.4% of this population.

✓ Probability is now:

– 82.0% !

✓ Exercise left to the listener....

27 ☐ Ignoring the base rate

- ✓ Recall: Base rate is the prior probability when no evidence.
- ✓ The taxicab and AIDS examples are evidence of *ignoring base rates*.
- ✓ People have a strong tendency to ignore the base rates and rely solely on evidence.

## 28 ☐ Medical decision making

- ✓ Doctors are frequently just as guilty of this type of reasoning as you and me.
- ✓ Eddy (1982)
  - 100 physicians given a scenario in which the base rate was low (1% for breast cancer)
  - The diagnosticity of the test (mammogram) was relatively low:
    - $P(\text{positive} \mid \text{tumor}) = .8$
    - $P(\text{negative} \mid \text{no tumor}) = .9$

## 29 ☐ Results

- ✓ 95 of the physicians estimated probability of breast cancer at about 75% (normative is around 7.5%).
- ✓ They ignored the base rate.

## 30 ☐ Source of biased attitudes

- ✓ Some people have been saying religion is at the root of terrorism.
  - WTC, bombing of abortion clinics, Ireland...
- ✓ As proof, they provide evidence that  $P(\text{religious conviction} \mid \text{terrorism})$  is large.
- ✓ But, what we care about is  $P(\text{terrorism} \mid \text{religious conviction})$ .

## 31 ☐ Bias, continued....

- ✓ Bayes theorem (as found in the ratio rule) says that base rates of these two matter:
  - $P(\text{religious}) \gg P(\text{terrorism})$
  - Thus  $P(\text{religious} \mid \text{terrorism})$  will of course be much greater than  $P(\text{terrorism} \mid \text{religious})$ .
  - Therefore, evidence of high  $P(\text{religious} \mid \text{terrorism})$  doesn't tell us much.
- ✓ People are ignoring base rates, and thus confusing the inverse.

## 32 ☐ Exceptions to ignoring the base rate

- ✓ If people *experience* the differences in base rates, then they are much more likely to use them.
- ✓ Christiansen-Szalanski & Bushyhead (1981)
  - Physicians
- ✓ Goodie & Fantino (1995, 1996)
  - Students

## 33 ☐ Summary

- ✓ People confuse the inverse
  - Believe that:  $P(A|B) = P(B|A)$  unless this is obviously false (pregnancy example)
  - Proper judgment depends on base rates.
    - $P(A)$  and  $P(B)$  (see ratio rule)
- ✓ Bayes theorem is a normative way to obtain  $P(A|B)$  given  $P(B|A)$ .

- ✓Easier to use frequency format than the theorem.
- ✓People who experience the base rate are more likely to use it.

### 34 ☐ Judgment of conjoint probability

- ✓Definition:  $P(A \text{ and } B) = P(A) \cdot P(B)$
- ✓Example
  - Two coin flips.
  - What's the probability of two tails?
    - $P(\text{Tails and Tails}) =$   
 $P(\text{Tails on first}) \cdot P(\text{Tails on second}) =$   
 $0.5 \cdot 0.5 = .25$

### 35 ☐ Example 2

- ✓Two die rolls.
- ✓What's the probability of snake eyes (2)?
  - $P(1 \text{ and } 1) =$   
 $P(1 \text{ on first}) \cdot P(1 \text{ on second}) =$   
 $1/6 \cdot 1/6 = 1/36 = 2.8\%$
  - Pretty straightforward, but...

### 36 ☐ Cohen, Chesnick, & Haran (1971)

- ✓Subjects asked to estimate the probability of winning a lottery.
  - To win, you must pick right combination of two numbers.
  - First number could be 1 to 5.
  - Second number could be 1 to 5.
- ✓Real probability:  $1/5 \cdot 1/5 = 1/25 = 4\%$ .
- ✓Estimated probability: 30%
- ✓People overestimate small probabilities... (prospect theory)

### 37 ☐ Independent vs. Dependent events

- ✓Prior examples assumed probabilistic independence.
- ✓Many events are not independent
  - Example, rate probability that Maria is a Democrat and voted for Kerry.
- ✓For *independent* events,  $P(A \ \& \ B) = P(A) \cdot P(B)$ , but not for *dependent* events
  - But, even for dependent events...
    - $P(A \text{ and } B) \leq P(A)$  and  $P(A \text{ and } B) \leq P(B)$
  - People don't conform....

### 38 ☐ Example of non-conformance: Conjunction error

- ✓People will rate
  - $P(\text{Democrat \& voted for Kerry}) >$   
 $P(\text{Democrat})$  or  $P(\text{Kerry})$
- ✓This reasoning violates basic probability rules.
- ✓Why?
  - A heuristic (plausibility) causes overestimates of a conjunction probability.

### 39 ☐ Conditional Likelihood: Summary

- ✓ Normative: Bayesian inference
- ✓ Tendency to ignore the base rate
- ✓ People reason more normatively when problem posed as frequencies rather than probabilities.
- ✓ People do not reason properly about conjoint probabilities.
- ✓ Next: An alternative theory for likelihood judgment by combining evidence.